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INTRODUCTION

This thesis will constitute an examination of Aristotle's
ethical philosophy with the specific purpose of determining the
extent to which Aristotle conceived moral phenomena as a
perfecting element of the human personality.

The treatment

will deal largely with two comprehensive ethical theories; the
teleological and the deontological, which when interpreted from
the Aristotelean text, shed light on his conception of moral
value and its status within the whole of human social values.
What bearing do the theories of teleology and deontology
have on the concept of moral perfection?

Each theory presents

a significantly different moral paradigm.

In a deontological

ethic the fully moral individual is one who has thoroughly
developed a sense of duty, an ability to recognize and a
disposition to fulfill obligations.

The consumate teleological

man is one who is able to determine and pursue certain ultimate
human values.

In the deontological paradigm the preoccupation

is with the disparity between inclination and obligation.

In

the teleological paradigm the essential problem is to determine
which human values are most worth pursuing and in what manner
they should be pursued.

The point should be made that for

Aristotle, moral perfection is not the same as human perfection.
Moral perfection is one type of perfection, but morality is
one of several important aspects of experiences which demands
attention and cultivation.

1
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There are a number of reasons why I believe it is worthwhile
to pursue this study.
in ethical concerns.

First, there is an obvious intrinsic value
Second, Aristotle treats the subject in

a remarkably distinctive and highly systematic fashion which
exposes a number of paradoxical and troublesome elements.
These elements constitute perennial problems encountered in
the study of ethics.

In addition, the precise manner in which

these difficulties arise enable a study to ascertain the
relevant strengths and weaknesses of Aristotle as an ethical
theorist.
Central to the theme of moral perfection is the fundamental
naturalism which shapes the conceptual and methodological
character of Aristotle's ethical writings.

By ethical

naturalism, I mean that all ethical phenomena are perceived as
being caused by identifiable physical, psychological and
sociological forces.

Aristotle conceives human society to be

the result of a natural inclination to associate and that all
such associations presuppose arrangements and practices that
would be characterized as ethical.

This naturalistic concept

leads Aristotle to approach the subject matter in a way which
establishes ethical philosophizing as distinct from a
metaphysical a priorism.

Morality, for Aristotle, is and has

been an existing feature of human society.

Any attempt to

formulate a theory about this subject must first start with an
examination of actual human society and construct a theory which
is consistent with the evidence.
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What, it may be asked, is the relationship between
perfectionism and naturalism?

If human association is natural,

if community is the source of ethical values then moral
perfection is possible.

As I stated above, deontology and

teleology present contrasting moral paradigms, and I believe
these two theories are very useful concepts in an evaluation of
moral perfection.

Kant's moral philosophy represents a pure

deontological ethic.

In an article entitled "The Kantian

Critique of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy:

An Appraisal"

Roger Sullivan compares Kant's best moral man with Aristotle's.
"Kant's best moral man is Aristotle's second best."1

Sullivan

suggests that the moral ideals of each thinker differ signifi
cantly.

There is a theological implication here.

What is

suggested is that because Kant's view of man is Christian he
sees less possible perfection for him in his present existence.
"Kant's best man is Aristotle's second best man because Aristotle
affirms what Kant denies, that moral consciousness and appetition
can achieve a state of rational harmony in this life."2

The

point is that the teleological ethical theory as developed by
Aristotle is dependent upon a naturalistic view of morality

1Roger J. Sullivan, "The Kantian Critique of Aristotle's
Moral Philosophy: An Appraisal", Review of Metaphysics, XXVIII
(Spetember 1974), 37.
2loc. cit., p. 51.
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that man's desires and inclinations can be brought to conform
with his consciousness of what is right.

But further, and

this is the thesis I wish to develop, although Aristotle's
conceptual framework is basically teleological, he is aware of
the concept of obligation, an awareness which is manifested by
deonotological elements in his ethical writings.

The common

opinion that Greek ethics had no concept of responsibility3 is,
I believe, a moot one.

"That axiology flourished among the

Greeks is shown by the frequently uttered but untrue complaint
that they had no concept corresponding to the m o d e m notion of
obligation."^
I hope to demonstrate that Aristotle does provide the
possibility of intrinsic moral value as embodied in the ideal
practical man, the Statesman.

Yet, as a note of caution, it

should be emphasized that the deonotological implications are
indeed just that, implications, and there is no fully developed
deontological theory.

The recognition of this fact rests with

the understanding of the limits of Classical Greek ethical
theory.

Alasdair MacIntyre in his A Short History of Ethics

points to the limitation in this way:

3Arthur W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study
in Greek Values (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 2.
^J. N. Findlay, Axiological Ethics (London & Basingstoke:
Macmillan St. Martin's Press, 1970), p. 4.
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In general, Greek ethics asks, What am I to
do if I am to fare well? Modern ethics asks,
what am I to do if I am to do right? and it asks
this question in such a way that doing right is
made something quite independent of faring well.5

This modern separation of "faring well" and "doing right" explains
why Kant's best man is Aristotle's second best man.

The fact that

Aristotle did not make this separation accounts for his construction
of faring well as being moral.
Is there any way for an ethical theorist to completely avoid
the problem of moral obligation?

The fact that Aristotle has

been both critized and defended by modern thinkers from Kant on,
suggests that his ethical views must somehow at least recognize
the problem which I believe he indeed does.
I intend to develop the proposed thesis in two chapters.
I will concentrate prinicpally on the Nicomachean Ethics, although
I will refer some to the Politics and the Metaphysics of Aristotle.
The first chapter will examine the method employed by
Aristotle.

A methodological analysis is significant to the

central theme because it can help to disclose philosophically
distinctive features which constitute the framework of his con
ception.

In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle performs two distinct

kinds of operations.

In one kind of operation he establishes

normative principles for action.

In order for character and

5Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 84.
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moral action to come into being certain objectives and necessary
conditions must be established and sustained.
examines the presuppositions for those claims.

In the second, he
It is by this

kind of critical procedure that Aristotle gives definition to
moral philosophy, establishes its limits and aims, prescribes a
well defined method and delineates the relation of ethics to the
whole of philosophy.

Thus in the Nicomachean Ethics there is a

combination of normative and critical elements which serve both
a practical and theoretical purpose.
What then, should an examination of the employed method
yield?

The method of establishing ethical norms should indicate

for one, their epistemological status.

Their limitations and

dimensions would be determined by the extent to which they can
claim a certainty of being known.

Furthermore, examining the

manner in which these values are constructed, how they are related
and/or derived from one another helps to disclose their hier
archical structure and determine principles of relative value
as well as the relationship of moral values to the other aspects
of human experience.

To take an example, in the Nicomachean

Ethics, Aristotle says that the self indulgent man is worse than
the incontinent man.5

What are his grounds for making this

6N.E. 1150a 31. All references from the Nicomachean Ethics,
unless otherwise indicated, will be taken from the W. D. Ross
translation, The Works of Aristotle, translated into English under
the editorship of W. D. Ross (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 19081952) 12 Volumes, and will take the above standard citation form.
References to other Aristotelean works will be taken from this
Ross edited work and will use standard citation form and cite the
translator of the specific work.
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evaluation?

The incontinent man is overcome by powerful appetites.

The self indulgent man has acted by reason of choice.

Thus,

"choice" is the key term for evaluative consideration.
choice?

Why

Because choice is deliberate and voluntary, and volun

tary wrongful acts are worse than involuntary wrongful acts.
Thus a voluntary act has a greater relative value than an in
voluntary.

But why is this so?

It is because voluntary actions

identify the agent as responsible and hence indicate a certain
quality of character.
of habituation.

Character is, for Aristotle, the result

In the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics he

says:

Hence anyone who is to listen to lectures
about what is noble and just and, generally,
about the subjects of political science must
have been brought up in good habits. For
the fact is the starting-point, and if this
is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at
the start need the reason as well; and the
man who has been well brought up has or can
easily get starting points.7

Now these remarks indicate that Aristotle equates moral develop
ment with a certain kind of educational practice.

One can be

in a position to understand ethical concepts only after
practicing them to the extent that they become a part of the
character.

The practices of morality must be temporally prior

to any attempt to understand it.

If one is "to listen

intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just" one

7N.E. 1095 b 5-10.
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must have first undergone personal acquaintance with ethical
practices.

Thus the duty of the ethical philosopher is first

to identify actual existing practices, to proceed empirically
("for the fact is the starting point") and to interpret these
practices in an educational context, that is, to consider their
transmission to others as preconditions for further moral
instruction.
The second chapter will deal with the character of the
ethical norms themselves.

More precisely, what justification

does Aristotle offer for his system of value?

Aristotle's

system is generally interpreted as being a teleological one.8
Indeed, his terminology throughout the Nicomachean Ethics is
decidedly teleological.

A teleologically based ethic holds

that the moral worth of an act must be evaluated by its consequences.
Thus, for any act to have moral value it must somehow bring about
some desired good.

In his ethical writings Aristotle elaborately

defines a good designated as "happiness" to be the ultimate good
for which human beings strive.

Very generally speaking then,

the sphere of morality lies within activities which tend to make
people happy.
At this point I think it is important to raise the issue
of the deontological aspects of Aristotle's theory.

As stated

above, ethical formalism or deontology, has its purest advocacy

Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 1,
Pt. 2: Greece & Rome, (Garden City, New York: Image Books,
1962), p. 74.
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in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

If any action is to be morally good, it is
not enough that it should conform to the moral
law— it must also be done for the sake of the
moral law; where this is not so, the conformity
is only too contingent and precarious since
the non-moral ground at work will now and then
produce actions which transgress it'. ^

Kant's conception of moral value lies in what appears to be a
formulation which is antithetical to Aristotle's.

The distinction

is set in terms of the intrinsic and extrinsic value of moral
acts.

In a strict teleological theory such as that attributed

to Aristotle, the moral worth of an act is equatable with the
possibility for producing an external good.

For Kant, an act is

of moral value if and only if it is done from a purity of motive
for

thelaw of morality itself.

In other words, the consequences

of an act are not relevant for purely moral considerations.
There are, however, significant deontological elements and
implications in Aristotle's theory.

Furthermore, these elements

and implications qualify and to a certain extent complicate the
intended position of morality in human affairs which Aristotle
attempts to establish.

This is not to say, however, that Aristotle

is a deontologist in the sense that Kant is.

Kant's position is

an extreme deontological one in which the concepts of inclination

9Immanuel Kant, "Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals"
in The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral
Philosophy, translated and edited by Lewis White Beck (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949), pg. 57. All following
references to Kant's works will be taken from this edition.
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and obligation are opposed.

I am claiming that Aristotle is a

deontologist only in the sense that he denies morality a purely
instrumental role in the attainment of the good life and recognizes
that moral virtue contains an intrinsic value.
The complication is most conspicuous in Book X, the final
book of the Nicomachean Ethics.

In this book Aristotle states

in what activity he believes the good for man to consist.

Happiness extends, then, just so far as con
templation does and those to whom contemplation
more fully belongs are more truely happy, not
as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the
contemplation for this is in itself precious.
Happiness, therefore must be some sort of
contemplation.10

Contemplation is an occupation distinct from practical kinds of
activities.

It involves the agent alone, using a purely theoret

ical reasoning capacity, whereas practical pursuits involve
political, social and artistic activities.

"Now the activity

of the practical virtues is exhibited in political or military
affairs.11

Moral action is, for Aristotle, a practical concern

as it deals with the realization of established goods.

"Practical

wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to
act with regard to human goods.12

10N.E. 1178b 25-30.
11N.E. 1177b 5.
12N.E. 1104b 20.
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The highest form of human occupation is an apolitical,
amoral one which is exclusively concerned with intellectual
objects.

So, in terms of perfection, active intellectual pursuit

is the aim.
What then is the relationship of moral activity to the
sphere of intellectual activity?

Aristotle might be interpreted

as saying that ethics serves only as a propaedeutic science, an
exercise in forming the human disposition so that intellectual
goals may become attainable.
There are crucial implications that follow from such an
interpretation.

Moral accomplishment or perfection is excluded

from and subordinate to intellectual perfection.

Thus, it would

be plausible to infer a dualistic concept of human nature.
Aristotle tells us in the Nicomachean Ethics that:

"moral

excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains, it is on
account of the pleasure that we do bad things and on account of
the pain that we abstain from noble ones."13

Pleasure and pain

are the primary forces that shape the human character.

In order,

then, for one to develop a good character, one must submit to a
process which administers the distribution of pleasure and pain
in the proper manner.

"Hence we ought to have been brought up in

a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as to
delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought, for this

13N.E. 1104b 5-10.
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is the right education."14
Theoretical education, on the other hand, employs a different
method which produces more immediate results.

"What has been

said is confirmed by the fact that while young men become geome
tricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it
is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found."15
Theoretical enterprises operate from abstract universal principles
which, due to their character of necessity, are intuitively grasped
and immediately employed.
Morality requires time.

It requires patience.

matters are always contingent in character.

Practical

There are almost

limitless possibilities, divergencies and exceptions.

Thus,

there is a need for a substantial amount of experience in order
for one to know general principles of action and to formulate a
consistent character.

Theory deals with that which is necessary.

It is, in a sense, timeless and immediately available to an
intellect properly trained to comprehend.
The practical-theoretical distinction suggests the above
proposed duality in the following manner.
the animality of the human being.

Morality conditions

Theoretical contemplation is

the condition of the spirituality of the human being.

Aristotle

draws an analogy between matters of morality and matters of
health.

"Matters concerned with conduct and questions of what

14N.E. 1104b 10-15.
15N.E. 1142a 14.
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is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health...
it is the nature of such things (both health and character) to be
destroyed by defect and excess.16

The purpose of establishing

a moral character is to enable one to develop a disposition to
act preservingly, to avoid the debilitating and destructive
consequences that result from overattendence to pleasurable
activities or a shrinking from potentially promising painful
activities.

Man shares with all other animals appetities which

are both self and species serving.

The appetities of animals other

than humans are dictated by instincts.
shaped by reasonable moderate habits.
what instincts do for other animals.

Human appetities must be
Habits achieve for man
That man can cultivate habits

is due to his unique nature as a reasoning animal.

Reason is the

instrumental force which determines the means by which well being
is secured.

Productive habits are determined so, ultimately,

by the standard of rationality.

If, as Aristotle asserts,

rationality is what defines man then the irrational appetitive
side of human nature must always be subordinate to the demands
of reason.

Morality, thus, involves a rational determination of

the appetative faculty.
from experience.

Rational principles of action are derived

The kind of reasoning involved in moral

experience is of a practical nature, and Aristotle is insistent
on making a clear and hard distinction between practical reason

16N.E. 1104a 5-15.
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and theoretical reason.
of the former.

Moral excellence requires a perfection

The morally perfect man is a practical man, a

man of action.
Theoretical knowledge, the object of contemplation, is by
its nature exclusive of objects or relations which are contingent
and particular.

This pure reasoning activity for Aristotle

constitutes the ultimate good
ideal is

apolitical.

of happiness.

The contemplative

The man of action, the political man, the

embodiment of practical reason, and the philosopher, the
embodiment of theoretical ideal, represent two distinct and seem
ingly unreconcilable paradigms.

But nevertheless both are essential

figures of the Nicomachean Ethics. The fact that both figures
are essential to Aristotle suggests that he sees the ideal of
contemplation to be very limited in its possibilities for
attainment.

But such a life [one of comtemplation] would be
too high for a man, for it is not in so far as
he is a man that he will live so, but in so far
as something divine is present in him: and by
so much as this is superior to our composite
nature is its activity superior to that which
is the exercise of the other kind of virtue.17

Aristotle postulates contemplation as the highest form of human
achievement yet insists that it is beyond strictly human capacities.
Because of its divine character it transcends the politicalethical sphere.

Consequently the Statesman is, for Aristotle,

17N.E. 1177b 25-30.
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the ethical ideal.

It is the Statesman that deals with composite

nature of man, the composite of animality and rationality.
Now if "Aristotle’s account of morality is a pure theory of
prudential action,"18 (and this is the charge made against
Aristotle by Kantian deontologists), then there is no possibility
for moral autonomy.

But this is not the case.

Aristotle does

postulate that some acts are worth doing for their own sake.
For example in his discussion of the particular virtue of courage
he says:

"But one ought to be brave not under compulsion but

because it is noble to be so."19
to Aristotle's ethics.

Here is a deontological side

"We can say that a theory is deontological

if and only if according to it some act is worth doing for its
own sake."20

The fact that Aristotle insists upon an intrinsic

value for good acts, that he perceives the good to be noble in
his own right is strong evidence for an Aristotelean notion of
moral autonomy.
Thus there emerges from Aristotle's ethics a tension which
can be presented in deontological-practical, teleologicalcontemplative terms.

The former presents an ideal of moral

action, the latter, contemplative happiness.

Happiness ultimately

lies in contemplation, and, consequently, the moral activity of
the statesman becomes a seperate end, valued in itself.

18Sullivan, op. cit., p. 25.
19N.E. 1116b 1.
20Bemard Baurim, "Aristotle's Ethical Intuitionsim", The
New Scholasticism, XLII (Winter, 1968), 5.
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CHAPTER I

METHODOLOGY IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

The following chapter will concentrate principally on the
first book of the Nicomachean Ethics. The question arises, why
and why only, Book I?
of length and time.

There is the obvious answer of limitations

Also the very structure of the Nicomachean

Ethics permits an analysis which would be helpful in understanding
what kind of ethical system Aristotle was attempting to establish.
Book I is of utmost importance for several reasons.

First,

Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics by attempting to define
the nature of the "good."

This is the central but by no means

only crucial thrust of Book I.

With the exception of the con

cluding lines of the tenth and final book, Book I is the only
book that deals essentially with defining what the good is for
man.

Books II through IX deal in an almost casuistic manner with

more specific aspects of ethical phenomena.

While Book I attempts

a definition of the ultimate human good, books II through VI
define, both generally and specifically, virtue as a means to
the good.

The remainder of the treatise deals with various

aspects of moral relevance such as continence, incontinence,
pleasure and friendship.

So, in a word, Aristotle’s procedure

is to provide a brief general conception of what human good is
and then at great length describe the process and intricacies
of its acquisition.

16
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In addition to his efforts to define the good, Aristotle,
in Book I, takes great pains to set down a well justified
methodological procedure.

The very nature of the good limits

and defines the procedure by which we understand and practice
good.

This methodological instruction is most crucial because

by it Aristotle pronounces and reveals the radical distinction
between the theoretical and the practical, the intellect and the
will.

In making such a distinction, Aristotle repudiates the

Platonic Metaphysics of Forms which makes "Good" an object of
knowledge but makes difficult its treatment in the concrete.
This problem will be discussed at greater length later.
This first book is a sketchy but complete treatise on the
nature of the good.

However, it also contains all seminal

ideas necessary for developing a full ethical system and it
states their relevance and potential either tacitly or by full
implication.

For example, in his introductory remarks Aristotle

demonstrates what he believes to be a most obvious truth:
all human actions and pursuits aim at some end or good.

that
However,

he immediately qualifies this by adding that there are real
differences to be found in ends or goods.

The fundamental

principle Aristotle is trying to establish is that all intelligent
action is purposive.

It is the purpose that gives the act value.

Now if various actions are defined by the purpose for which they
are undertaken, then it becomes important, since there is an
endless variety of possible action, to determine a proper course
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of action, in a word, choice.

Implicit here is the ethical

concept of choice which is later fully developed.
Also early in this first book Aristotle concludes that it
is the discipline of politics which treats the good for man.21
Why politics?
of value.

Because in part, it is the answer to the problem

Value is introduced and assumed to be the purpose or

reason for the completion of any kind of action.

From this

follows another important distinction, that of subordinate value.
One value is subordinate to another if the action which is under
taken is done to advance the accomplishments of an activity
which on completion entails
part a matter of complexity.

greater complexity.

So value is in

Now politics, as the discipline

dealing with the good, is proved to be so by two different kinds
of justification.

The first, from the basis of value lying in

the complex the most complex discipline which dictates action
is that of politics.

Subordinate to the discipline of politics

are other important action directing disciplines such as rhetoric,
economics, strategy, etc., which are used by and subordinate to
politics.

The second justification is an appeal to the facts of

society, that is, it is the politician who coordinates and
directs all activities in society which are conducive to the
effective operation of the society.

It is no accident that

Aristotle establishes early and effectively that politics is a

21N.E. 1094b 10.
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hierarchic discipline.

In so doing he helps portray the signif

icant relation between the ethical man and the political order
which must exist in order for that man to come into being.
Also mentioned, but defered for later treatment, is the
Aristotelean concept of virtue.

The concept of virtue is

introduced at a point where Aristotle is attempting to add
substantially to the concept of happiness.22

His point is that

in order to fully understand the most important human achieve
ment, happiness, it is essential to determine a function or
activity which is peculiarly human and hence embraces what is
genuinely human.

Of course, what Aristotle considers uniquely

human is the propensity to reason.

He says that "human good

turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue,
and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the
best and most complete."2 3 Developing this reasoning capacity
and incorporating it into action is what comprises the nature of
virtue.

Thus virtue has an instrumental role in the facilitation

of man's proper function.
In this first book we have important elements of completion
and promise.

The good for man is happiness and is justified by

its complexity and finality.

That is, happiness is the good for

man because it is the reason for which he performs all conscious
activities.

But in order to be happy he must perform all of

22N.E. 1098a 1-20.
23N.E. 1098a 15-20.
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his actions in a manner which is compatible and consistent with
his nature of being human, namely a manner which is characterized
by rationality.

So in the first book there are two complete

and defended doctrines.

The first is the metaphysically based

doctrine of teleology, which essentially asserts that all
activity, particularly human activity, is essentially purposeful.
The second is the metaphysically based doctrine of species which
assigns a similarity of design and or function to naturally
similar things— and hence human nature comes to be explained in

terms of a rational function.

Added to these notions are im

plications and distinctions that are essential to the development
of an objective ethical system.

Establishing intelligent action

as the basis for human happiness still leaves many ambiguous
areas of consideration such as how does one become disposed
toward intelligent acts (the problem of virtue), or when is one
responsible for his action (the problem of choice and compulsion).
Aristotle is also aware of the non-rational forces that effect
the human condition such as pleasure and the effect and bearing
they have on moral experience.
Finally one must look to this first book to understand how
Aristotle fits in the ethical-political aspects of man with the
totality of his experience.

It is the display of method in this

book which clearly indicates what activity Aristotle believed
to be moral philosophizing and its essential difference from
natural philosophizing.

It is from this proposal of method that

we grasp both the expectations and limitations of what we can
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know about how to act.

We can see both what Aristotle thinks

morality should be and what moral philosophy in perspective
should be.
In analyzing the Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, it is profitable
to first follow the general progression of argument throughout
while concentrating on the various facets of argument.

There are

four basic claims put forth in Book I:
(1)

All activities have an end or good (1094a 1-15).

(2)

There is one final end or good for man (1094a 15-25).

(3)

Man's end or good is happiness (1095a 10-20).

(4)

Happiness is the result of a virtuous life (1098a 10-20).

What is Aristotle's justification for making these claims?
There is the first claim:

"Every art and every inquiry and

similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good
and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that
at which all things aim."24
qualifications.

Now here Aristotle makes several

There is the above mentioned concept of value

subordinated by the principle of complexity of end.
another distinction made here.

There is

"Where there are ends apart from

the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than
the activities."25

This is a distinction that establishes an

essential difference between the question of value when applied
to product (art) and the question of value when applied to

24N.E. 1094a 1-5.
25N.E. 1094a 5-7.
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activities appraised in their own right (morality). Thus there
are two aspects of human experience, art and morality, which are
judged by two different standards.

One final point in this

regard is established thus by Aristotle.

In all of these [the various disciplines] the
ends of the master arts are to be preferred to
all the subordinate ends; for it is for the
sake of the former that the latter are pursued.
It makes no difference whether the activities
themselves are the end of the actions, or
something else apart from the activities.26

The principle of subordinate value takes precedent when various
arts or disciplines are involved in the accomplishment of a
higher more complex enterprise.

If a variety of subordinate

values are situated in a value subordinate to a higher activity,
then the subordinate values, regardless of whether they are
productive activities which are valued in their own right, are
lesser in relative value.
From this characterization of human acts follows the second
essential step.

If then there is some end of the things we do,
which we desire for its own sake (everything
else being desired for the sake of this), and
if we do not choose everything for the sake of
something else (for at that rate the process
would go on to infinity, so that our desire
would be empty and vain), clearly this must be
the good and the chief good.27

26N.E. 1094a 12-17.
27N.E. 1094a 18-21.
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The justification for this claim is two fold:

it is primarily

a matter of logic, that is, for anything to have meaning it
must in some way be conclusive.

An infinite series is intellec

tually useless or trite because

there is no way it can be

apprehended or evaluated.

The lack of an ultimate goal or end

in itself, would subject the entirety of human desire to an
- - unintelligible and meaningless series.

Moreover, experience seems

to confirm the notion that all our desires are not empty and vain.
At least men generally do not act as if that were the case, as
they exhibit care and prudence in carrying out fulfillment of
desires.
The third step involves defining the good as happiness.
However, Aristotle admits that this adds nothing immediately
substantial to the treatment.

What it is that we say political science aims
at and what is the highest of all goods
achievable by action. Verbally there is very
general agreement; for both the general run
of men and people of superior refinement say
that is is happiness and identify living well
and doing well with being happy; but with
regard to what happiness is they differ and
the many do not give the same account as the
wise.2 8

The problem of defining "the good" becomes the problem
of defining happiness.
are equivocal.

Now the terms "good" and "happiness"

Aristotle is careful to mention that he is

28N.E. 1095a 15-20.
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discussing goods "achievable by action."

The problem of "good,"

generically considered and particularly applied, is one which
requires for Aristotle a critical examination of Plato's doctrine
of Forms.
later.

The analysis of this examination will be taken up

Aristotle's mention of the differing accounts of happiness

is a prefatory remark which will provide a basis from which to
further his investigation into the nature of happiness.

Aristotle

wishes to draw conclusions from common and reasonable opinion.
He sees the substance of definition there.

By extracting the

factual, the demonstrable, from the various opinions one can
draw reasonably certain conclusions about the subject matter.

We must consider it [happiness] however in the
light not only of our conclusion and premises,
but also of what is commonly said about it; for
with a true view all the data harmonize, but
with a false one the facts soon clash.29

Utilizing this method Aristotle surveys commonly expressed
opinions about the nature of happiness which enables him to
significantly qualify the notion.

He rejects the view advanced

by the common man that happiness is equatable with pleasure on
the ground that pleasure seeking engages only the lowest
capacities, capacities which are common with beasts as well
as man.30

29N.E. 1098b 15-25.
30N.E. 1095b 15-25.
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Aristotle also rejects an identification of happiness with
political honor which he considers much too vulnerable and elusive
to be established as the chief human good.31
He also considers a life of virtue as the constitution of
happiness and suggest that it may be superior to political honor
but concludes that virtue as happiness will not equate because
the possession may be construed passively so that one might be
virtuous but inactive, unfortunate and miserable.32
Thus one can say certain things about the nature of
happiness. — It is not completely identifiable with pleasure,
political honor or virtue.

Each of these have severe limitations

which make them incompatible happiness as the final good.
What Aristotle does, to take us to the fourth major claim,
is, after examining the various opinions about happiness and
measuring them by the concept of good as an essential and final
human activity, to return to the first two claims that every
activity has an end and the end for which we do all our actions
is the final end or good achievable by action.
has complete finality.
finality?

The chief good

Does happiness have this character of

Some pursuits are undertaken for their own sake yet

have a reference to another activity.

But happiness is uniquely

final, it is never pursued for any other reason than its own
sake.

31N.E. 1095b 25-27.
32N.E. 1095b 30-35.
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Aristotle now adds one more qualification to the concept of
happiness.

Happiness carries a certain degree of self-

sufficiency which is perhaps most obvious.33
of dependency are fortuity and vulnerability.

The consequences
If happiness is

the result of one's own activity its acquisition is designed and
commanded with the means internally located rather than externally
poised.
From this treatment of the concept of happiness a number
of facets are illuminated.

We know what it is not.

We also

know that happiness, eudaemonia, "is something final and selfsufficient and is the end of action."3tt
With this general concept of happiness Aristotle makes the
fourth and final basic claim of Book I.

We state the function of man to be a certain
kind of life, and this to be an activity or
action of the soul implying a rational principle....
Human good turns out to be an activity of the soul
in accordance with virtue.35

However, Aristotle is dissatisfied with his general outline of
happiness.

Presumably to say that happiness is the chief
good seems a platitude and a clearer account of
what it is is still desired. This might perhaps
be given if we could first ascertain the function
of man.36

33N.E. 1097b 7-20.
3ltN.E. 1097b 21.
35N.E. 1098a 10-20.
36N.E. 1097b 22-25.
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Aristotle does not ask jLf man has a function.

He assumes its

existence and raises the question of what it is.
Aristotle believe that man has a function?

Why does

This belief is

rooted in Aristotle's hylomorphic philosophy of nature and in
his theory of causality.

All natural entities are the conq>osed

result of matter (the undifferentiated substance that makes up
things) and form (that which differentiates or specifies an
object giving it an identity as a certain kind of object).
and form are two of the four constituitive causes.

Matter

The other

two are efficient cause, that external element or impetus which
acts to bring about change, and final cause, the reason for
which anything happens or takes place.37
If we look at man with this theory in mind it is easy to
see why Aristotle believes that man has a function.

First of

all it is important to note that "man" is more than a convenient
linguistic term to designate creatures which possess a certain
similarity; Aristotle is no nominalist.

"Man" is the term we

must use to refer to creatures who possess and display reason.
The material cause of a man is the physical substance out of
which he is composed.

His formal cause (that essence or principle

which differentiates him from all material things) is that he can
reason.

His efficient causes are the coital and natal events

which bring him into existence.
reason for which he lives.

37Physics. 194b 25-35.

The final cause of a man is that

The proof for final cause has already

R. P. Hardie and P. K. Gaye translators.
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been cited (see above, p. 23).

A denial of finality renders

human desires and the actions to fulfill those desires wholly
arbitrary and lacking in any ultimate justification.
Thus when Aristotle says that it might be better to
understand what happiness means by determining the function of
man he is proceeding from his metaphysically based notions of
formal and final causality.
a man.

It is reason which defines him as

Thus rationality which is the specifying cause of a

man becomes by exercise the final cause of his existence.

If

reason is the essential unique constitutional element of manhood
then there is an obligation to exercise it in order to be fully
human.

Man's function or purpose is rational exercise.

So

finally Aristotle presents a precise conclusive definition of
happiness.

Happiness is the cultivation and practice of reason.

A problem does arise here with respect to the claim that
Aristotle is an ethical naturalist.

It appears from what was

outlined directly above, that morality is ultimately based upon
the metaphysically based doctrine of species from which is
derived the concept of a unique human function.

Does the fact

that Aristotle derives a conception of a fixed human nature
from metaphysically based doctrines negate the claim that he is
an ethical naturalizt?

I do not believe so.

end of ethical activity is action.

For Aristotle the

What is sought is not a

theoretical knowledge of what good is but the actuality of persons
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with good characters.3® His method for achieving this end is
practical and empirical.

One becomes virtuous by means of

education, an education which is founded upon a wide range of
social experience.

Thus the possibility of moral perfection lies

within social institutions.

But what is the relation between

the natural morality of social institutions and the metaphysically
based doctrine of species?

Harry Jaffa in his book, Thomism

and Aristotelianism, sees the existence of natural morality as
a legitimate derivation from the metaphysical doctrine.

First there is the assumption as to the
existence of a "natural morality." This
assumption is, indeed, a legitimate inference
from the Aristotelian doctrine and follows
necessarily from the Aristotelian doctrine
of species. If each species is one, and is
properly defined by its form, which is its
perfection, then each individual of the
species attains its proper "good" in the
realization of this perfection....Moral
perfection is the perfection and application
of reason in the sphere of action.39

Jaffa goes on to make the point that one can quite
legitimately question the truth of the metaphysical doctrine
of species and to doubt the truth of the practical doctrine
which is derived from it.

Therefore, a rejection of Aristotle’s

metaphysical theories would entail a rejection of his practical

38N.E. 1103b 30.
39Harry V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 23-24.
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theories.

But Jaffa's final point with respect to this matter

is that the truth or falsity of Aristotle's doctrine of species
is not important in terms of the practical consequences.

The need for moral certainty exists and will
continue to exist whether a metaphysical
foundation for it can be found or not....There is
no apriori knowledge of the premises from which
a practical doctrine of human nature would have
to be inferred; for the premises from which a
sufficient knowledge of morality would have to
be inferred are, as Aristotle repeatedly says,
a knowledge of the particular moral facts.

The point is that Aristotle's ethical theory can be considered
naturalistic from both a methodological and an epistemological
view even though it has a metaphysical foundation.
This, as far as basic argument, is the major progression of
Book I.

The rest of Book I involves more testing of his claims

by appeal to, and examination of, credible opinion and a
preliminary treatment of virtue (taken up and developed both in
general and in particular for the next four books) Which is
Aristotle's means for developing rational disposition in order to
make happiness attainable.

What Aristotle has done is to

quickly raise and quickly settle the problem of what "good" is.
The bulk of the remaining treatise devoted to how the good is
brought into being.
The good, happiness, is defined by Aristotle strictly in
intellectual terms, that is to say, happiness lies in the

40Ibid.
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cultivation of rationality.

In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics,

his description of happiness is more explicit than in Book I.
He shows that happiness in its purest form is an activity of
philosophic contemplation and that contemplation above all depends
upon leisure.

He adds that politics is an unleisurely activity

and that the Statesman is an unleisurely fellow.

In effect,

Aristotle makes happiness a good that wholly transcends the
moral-political sphere.

In Book I Aristotle gives a short and

adumbrative treatment of what the good is and the remaining books
of the Nicomachean Ethics are devoted to a large extent to an
examination of the nature of virtue, particularly practical
virtue.

This fact is, I believe, a strong indication of Aristotle’

concern with two seperate ideals, the contemplative and the
practical.

In Books I and X he defines contemplation as the end

for man, but also in Book I he takes great effort to make a
methodological distinction.

It is this distinction that reveals

his concern for practical ideals and suggests that his lengthy
treatment of the nature of virtue is a recognition of the value
of practical excellence and of

the empirical nature of its study.

Moral philosophy employs a substantially different method
than natural philosophy.
Ethics is:

The opening sentence of the Nicomachean

"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every

action and purusit is thought to aim at some good."41

He

41N.E. 1094a 1.
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immediately qualifies:
among ends."1*2

"But a certain difference is to be found

Various activities and disciplines can be distin

guished and differentiated in part by determining what they are
intended to do.
philosophy?

What then is the end or purpose of moral

Aristotle says:

"The end aimed at is not knowledge

but action.1*3 This is why the discipline which is assigned to
the study of the end or good for which we do all our actions is
politics.

The purpose intended is a formation of good citizens

rather than an abstracted knowledge of what good is.
Various disciplines can also be distinguished by what
degrees of exactitude the subject matter will yield.

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as
much clearness as the subject matter admits
of, for precision is not to be a sought for
alike in all discussions, any more than in
all the products of the crafts.1*1*

So before one sets forth into any inquiry one must know what
he can look for and what he should demand.

"It is the mark of

an educated man to look for precision in each class of things
just so far as the nature of the subject admits."1*5
What Aristotle does here is to distinguish between
disciplines which measure and judge ideas and those which determine

**2N.E. 1094a 4.
^N.E. 1094a 4.
^N.E. 1094b 12-14.
^N.E. 1094b 25-27.
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and measure human actions.

The subject matter with which

political science is concerned is inexact.

Now fine and just acts which political science
investigates admit of much variety and fluction
of opinion so that they may be thought to exist
only by convention and not by nature.46

It is obviously not easy to give an exact definition of nobility
and justice.

Moreover, material goods have no exact or universally

beneficial effect upon men.

And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation
because they bring harm to many people; for
before now men have been undone by reason of
their wealth.47

Aristotle is here establishing the justification and
necessity for the use of a particular method.

Disciplines are

distinguished by differences in ends and in the degree of
exactitude the subject matter will yield.
politics

The discipline of

at action for its end and admits of considerable

variety in its principles and conclusions.

Thus, the kind of

method employed by this discipline is somewhat limited.

We must be content, then in speaking of such sub
jects [political subjects] and with such premises
to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and
speaking about things which are only for the most
part true and with premises of the same kind to
reach conclusions that are no better.48

46N.E. 1094b 15-17.
47N.E. 1094b 18-20.
48N.E. 1094b 20-24.
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The discipline of politics takes on a constitution which is general,
qualified and adumbrative.
Aristotle further exposes his method by stating that in
order to study politics one must possess a certain type of
character.

This, of course, is entirely consistent with the

established aim of politics as action.

Action must arise out

of character and this is why he takes pains to describe what kind
of student the discipline of politics requires.

Right action

requires not only intellectual analysis but also a disposition
which is rightfully inclined.

Intellectual apprehension without

the resolved character is useless.

Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of
lectures in political science. It makes no
difference whether he is young in years or
youthful in character; the defect does not
depend on time but on his living and pursuing
each successive object as passion directs.
For to such persons, as to the incontinent,
knowledge brings no profit. **9

Theoretical knowledge requires only an intellectual grasp.
Knowledge leading to action is a different matter.

Aristotle

gleans this distinction by pointing to the epistemological
differences.

"While we must begin with what is known, things

are objects of knowledge In two senses— some to us, some
without qualification."50

**9N.E. 1095a 3-10.
50N.E. 1095b 1-4.
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Objects of knowledge "without qualification" are intuitive,
immediate and universal.

Objects of knowledge "to us" are

empirical experiential and qualified.

The objects of knowledge

known without qualification require only the intellect and the
immediacy of external reality.
constitutes

One can come to know what

. good, noble or just acts by doing them.

Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently
to lectures about what is noble and just and,
generally, about the subject of political
science must have been brought up in good
habits. *

One must first acquire the character to act.

This acquisition

is the necessary beginning of morality and of understanding
about morality.

If one has been accustomed to doing the right

things, even without knowing the reasons for doing them, then
his potential and capacity for understanding the nature of
ethical phenomenon will be generous.
In order to further and finally establish the unique
character of the moral disciplines Aristotle next works his most
critical evaluation of the book.

We had perhaps better consider the universal
good and discuss what is meant by it, although
such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the
fact that the Forms have been introduced by
friends of our own.52

51N.E. 1095b 3-6.
52N.E. 1095a 10-12.
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According to Aristotle the theory of the Forms introduced by
Plato, particularly with reference to the Form "Good", is
fundamentally in error and has contributed to error.

This

criticism is consistent with Aristotle’s naturalistic and
methodological view.

He denies a supernatural status to the

"the Good” and locates it in the natural world.

This denial

also reflects his concern with accounting for particular
instances of goodness.

He says in Book 1:

For the fact is the starting point, and
if this is sufficiently plain to him he
[the student of ethics] will not at the
start need the reason as well.53

The point is that ethical training is a practical matter which
begins with the factual situation itself.

By repudiating the

supernatural character of the Forms, Aristotle rejects Plato’s
moral intellectualism, the equation of virtue and knowledge, and
establishes his fundamental distinction between the intellectual
and the volitional.
There are four basic objections to Plato’s Form theory in
its application to the "Good."

The objections challenge the

metaphysical character of the Forms on the grounds that they can
in no way maintain an independent ontological status and at the
same time do justice to the world of particulars.

The first

53N.E. 1095b 5.
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objection takes this form.

Proponents of the universal Form

"Good",

Did not posit Ideas [Forms] of classes within
which they recognized priority and posteriority
which is the reason why they did not maintain
the existence of a Form embracing numbers."511

There can be no Form for number because a greater or lesser can
always be conceived.

There is a failure by these proponents to

realize the inconsistency of positing a universal good which
also has the same properties of priority and posteriority, for
example, "good" is used both substantially and attributively.
If good is substance then it is ontologically prior to any
attributive aspect.

Attributive aspects are accidental and

participate in various classes of substance.

Hence r ' * would

be an impossibility of a common form of the good which would
embrace all the various particulars.

If "good" is used

attributively as well as substantially, then all its singular
predications in categories other than substance would violate
its singular nature as one Form or Idea.

But, on the other hand,

if there can be no universal predication of the good through all
the categories there can be no particular goods.

Thus if "good"

is a universal Form, it must be singular, substantial and hence
not attributable to any other category.

If good is attributed

to particular categories then it relinquishes its substantial
singular nature as a Form.

5ifN.E. 1096a 16-18.
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The second objection is a slightly different facet of the
first but is more directly applicable to the subject of method.
The Platonists assign to every single Form a particular science
to which it attends.
of the Form "Good"?

Which Aristotle asks, is the single science
Good seems to be obtained in many different

areas and sciences rather than one.55
The third objection leveled is that the distinction
between any absolute Form of a thing and the particular thing
itself is an empty distinction.

He states:

And one might ask the question, what in the
world they mean by a thing in itself, if as
is the case, in man himself, and in a
particular man the account of man is one and
the same.56

How is the particular man less than the Form "man"?
With the fourth objection Aristotle makes a semantic
concession to the Platonists.

He concedes that the good being

discussed may be equivocal in signification, that is, the
Platonists may not be speaking about all goods but merely that
good loved for itself (the Form "Good").

Thus, goods may be

spoken of in two ways, the above and in a secondary sense.

The

problem Aristotle suggests is, how one is to determine which
are the goods that are goods in themselves?

There are goods,

which isolated seem to be goods in themselves, yet seem to be

55N.E. 1096

25-29.

56N.E. 1096a 33-35.
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often pursued for other reasons.
is pursued for its own sake?

What "good" is there then that

Is the Idea of Good, good in itself?

This makes the Form contentless.

If such isolated goods such as

virtue, intelligence, pleasure, etc., are actually goods in
themselves, then the explanation of "good" will need to have some
element that is common to all of these.

Such an identical

element seems to be lacking.57
By dhderstanding Aristotle's criticism and departure from
Plato's theory of the "Good" one can see precisely what moral
philosophy means for Aristotle.

What is explicitly rejected

here is the view that attempts to explain the moral qualities
evident in human society by referring them to an abstracted
entity which is ontologically prior.

This rejection of the

strict metaphysical concept of good serves to explain the method
and substance of Aristotlean Ethics.

Once the good as a meta

physical entity is disregarded then its consideration changes
radically.

The good then is sought for in society.

is the location for value.

Society

There are substantial pre-philosophical

opinions used by Aristotle as evidence.

Morality is a firmly

constituted element in society prior to precise theoretical
conceptions about it.

Consequently it is important for

Aristotle to examine intelligent opinion and practice in order
to extract the truth.

57N.E. 1096b 10-25.
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We must consider it [happiness] in the light
not only of our conclusion and premises but
also of what is commonly said about it for
with a true view all the data harmonize but
with a false one the facts soon clash.58

Aristotle considers a number of well established views about
happiness and attempts to determine what elements of truth lie
in these varying opinions.

For some identify happiness with virtue, some
with practical wisdom, others with a kind of
philosophic wisdom, others with these or one
of these accompanied by pleasure or not with
out pleasure; while others include also
external property. Now some of these views
have been held by many men and of old, others
by a few prominent persons; and it is not
probable that either of these should be
entirely mistaken.58

Aristotle is looking to society for factual material to cooberate
his theory.

He is seeking to establish a balance between what

is and what ought to be.

Various elements in society that

contribute to the formation of character and personality must be
accounted for.

Pleasure, virtue and property are basic human

values with which every society must contend.

To discover with

what men are pleased and the consistency of the objects of
pleasure reveals an essential connection between pleasure and
happiness.

So too with property, one must determine how it

figures in happiness, how important and necessary it is, if at
all.

58N.E. 1098a 10-12.
59N.E. 1098b 23-29.
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Next, note what Aristotle says about the procedure of
ethical inquiry.

"We must be content, then in speaking of such

subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly
and in outline."60

It should also be noted that Aristotle

faithfully follows his own prescription.

He provides an

extensive outline noting both common and enlightened opinions,
both difficulties involved in, and promises of, opinions.

He

attempts to touch all reasonable and salient aspects that could
have application to moral considerations.
This consistent methodological practice establishes the
priority treatment and development of the concept of virtue,
the concept upon which the major portion of the Nicomachean
Ethics elaborates.

One must remember the purpose that Aristotle

insists on is the end of ethical inquiry.
not knowledge but action....

"The end aimed at is

Therefore, if there is an end for

all that we do, this will be the good achieveable by action.61
This in part, explains the major emphasis on virtue.
involves the practice and accomplishment of habits.

For virtue
It is a

means that results in the end desired, happiness.
The answer to the question we are asking is
plain also from the definition of happiness,
for it has been said to be a virtuous activity
of the soul.... Political science spends most
of its pains on making the citizen to be of a
certain character, viz. good and capable of
noble acts.62

60N.E. 1096b 20-21.
61N.E. 1094a 4, 1096a 24.
62N.E. 1099b 25-30.

1097a 1-10.
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The emphasis then is upon the achievement, the development of
good character.

But, one might ask, what is good character?

The Platonists, Aristotle shows,53 advance the claim that
knowledge of the "Good" may be of profit to anyone studying
any sort of good as it may serve as an absolute and ameliorating
standard.

Aristotle grants that the argument has some merit

but objects to it principally on methodological grounds.

This argument has some plausibility but seems
to clash with the procedure of the sciences;
for all of these though they aim at some good
and seek to supply the deficiency of it leave
on one side the knowledge of the good.54

In other words, an ontological, simple and independent good can
have no meaningful bearing upon particular goods.

Good health

can only be found in particular individuals.
This departure from Plato sharply demonstrates the firm
naturalism of Aristotle's ethics and holds the answers to many
questions concerning the structure and method of the Nicomachean
Ethics. The metaphysical problem of the good for Aristotle
has no immediate application to ethical philosophy.

The aim is

action, one comes to know what goodness is by doing good acts,
thus the acquisition of the disposition is in practice prior to
knowledge of what makes the act good.

Consequently, one must

53N.E. 1096b 33-35, 1097a 1-10.
6t*N.E. 1095a 1-5.
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make virtue the principle consideration of ethics.

By understand

ing the nature of virtue one can know how to become good.

To

discover what constitutes goodness one looks to society, one
examines the institutions, practices and opinions therein.

This

follows simply and consistently with Aristotle’s conception of
human society as a natural arrangement.
This naturalism also explains why Aristotle draws no formal
distinction between ethics and politics.

Indeed, "politics" is

the generic designation for the discipline which deals with
morality.

Ethics and economics are specified simply because they

differ strictly in number of persons dealt with.

The study of

government is not for Aristotle as it is for the moderns, the
study of the manipulation, distribution and preservation of
power.

Because human society is natural the relationship between

man and the state is every bit as moral and reciprocal as any
relationship between man and man.
In concluding in this chapter I wish to emphasize the point
that the first book of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is intended
to set up the tension between the teleological and deontological
interpretations, a tension which is manifested by his defintion
and treatment of the "Good" which is happiness as an intellectual
value and by his assignment to the Statesman the business of
cultivating the moral values in the people.

In Plato's Republic

the philosopher is the king; in Aristotle, philosophy and politics
are two seperate affairs, each being intrinsically valuable.
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CHAPTER II

TELEOLOGY AND DEONTOLOGY

An interpretation of Aristotle's ethics as teleological
can be derived principally from Books I and X of the Nichomachean
Ethics, the first and final books of this work.

These two

books are emphatically teleologically in conception.

This is

I think, significant structually because both books are con
cerned primarily with determining the good, the ultimate value
of human existence.

Book I poses arguments to prove that there

is such a good or value, that that good is happiness, and that
happiness consists in virtuous activity.

Book X defines what

kind of virtuous activity constitutes happiness, why it does so
and why it does so in a way which no other activity can.
Central to the arguments of both these books is Aristotle's
belief in a fixed concept of human nature.

The "good" that

Aristotle describes and prescribes in these two is a consequence
of human nature.

What is "good" means in this sense what is

human and what is best is that which is consumately human.
However, man is specified by Aristotle in two different ways.
He is distinguished from other animals by virtue of his reasoning
capacity.65

Man is also distinguished from other creatures by

65N.E. 1097b 30, 1098a 5-10.
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his social-political capacities.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation
of nature and that man is by nature a political
animal...and it is characteristic of man that
he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just
and unjust and the like, and the association
of living beings who have this sense makes a
family and a state.66

These two definitions of man are essential to the ethical
doctrines of the Nicomachean Ethics. But each is featured
prominently at different points whereby an exclusive concen
tration may result in a misleading interpretation.

The

teleological emphasis of Books I and X is closely tied to
definition of man as a rational animal.

"Good" is defined in

terms of ends, the human end is rationality.

This construction

considered by itself results in a wholly intellectualistic
ethical system.

It ascribes to moral phenomena no independent

value status.
However, Aristotle is also concerned with accounting for
man's social nature.

He does this by the development of the

concepts of moral virtue and practical wisdom.
the former, Book VI, the latter.
deontological in character.

Book II developes

These two books are more

They establish ethics as an

internally justified social aspect of human experience.
In the first six chapters of Book II Aristotle methodically

66Politics, 1253a 5-15.

Benjamin Jowett, translator.
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elucidates and refines the concept of moral virtue in a number
of progressive steps.

In chapter one he distinguishes moral

*

from intellectual virtue.

This distinction is made in terms

of their origin or cause.

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle says

that the most essential part of knowledge is the recognition
of causes; "for we say we know each thing only when we recognize
its first cause."57

Intellectual virtue originates and is

fostered by instruction; moral virtue is the consequence of
practice.

Virtue then, being of two kinds, intellectual
and moral, intellectual virtue in the main
owes both its birth and its growth to teaching
(for which reason it requires experience and
time), while moral virtue comes about as a
result of habit.68

A morally virtuous state is a potential that is actualized
by the consistent practice of virtuous activities.

This raises

a possible problem of circularity, (which will be dealt with
later in the chapter), in that, if one is doing virtuous actions
is he not already in some way virtuous?
Next in chapter 2, Book II, Aristotle describes the
"mean"-like quality of virtue.

At the beginning of this

chapter he again insists upon the normative nature of this
study.

We aim at "being good" not knowing what goodness is.

67Metaphysics, 983b 25.

W. D. Ross, translator.

68N.E. 1103a 15-20.
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He also reiterates the relative character of questions of
conduct.

Moral virtue is classified as a mean, determined by

right rule, between excess and defect with regard to pleasure
and pains.
This concept leads Aristotle to the next refining step,
that of the relation of moral virtue to pleasure and pain.
Pleasure and pain are vitally connected to moral virtue.
"For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains;
it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things, and on
account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones."69
Pleasure and pain are described as causes of misconduct.
These are also the moral measure of our actions.

Whether one

is pleased or pained by an act indicates his moral state.

We must take asa sign of states of character
the pleasure orpain that ensues on acts; for
the man who abstains from bodily pleasures
and delights inthis very fact is temperate,
while the man who is annoyed at it is self
indulgent.70

Thus pleasure and pain are for Aristotle the Instrumental
psychological forces that play in the construction of character.
It is the mean, a moderate balancing of the extremes of these
states that characterizes moral virtue.
Moral virtue is next distinguished from ~xt.

To do this

Aristotle raises the earlier mentioned problem of circularity.

69N.E. 1104b 10-12.
70N.E. 1104b 5.
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The question might be asked, what we mean by
saying that we must become just by doing just
acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts:
for if men do just and temperate acts,
exactly as, if they do what is in accordance
with the laws of grammar and of music, they
are grammarians and musicians.71

An art, such as grammar, he maintains, can only be practiced,
in the full sense of the term, by one who has a conscious
internalized knowledge of the principles of that art.

One

may act gramatically or musically by chance or imitation
which makes the action an artistic one only in an incidental
way.

This is also true of moral virtue.

Virtuous actions

must consciously proceed from a consistent character.
The difference between art and moral virtue lies in the
value attached to the external consequences of each.

The

product of an artistic endeavor commands a value independent
of the process of production.

The value attached to a

morally virtuous act is entirely contingent upon the internal
disposition of the agent.

In order for an act to qualify as

virtuous it must satisfy the following conditions.

The agent also must be in a certain condition
when he does them [virtuous acts]; in the
first place he must have knowledge, secondly,
he must choose the acts, and choose them for
their own sakes, and thirdly his action must
proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.72

71N.E. 1105a 15-20.
72N.E. 1105a 30, 1105b 1.
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The conditions of knowledge and choice are required for
obvious reasons.
agent.

They establish the responsibility of the

But, most significant for our purposes, are the

requirements of choosing the actions for their own sakes and
of the actions proceeding from a firm and unchangeable
character.

These requirements lend considerable force to an

interpretation of moral value which is intrinsic in nature
rather than consequential or teleological.

That one should

choose to perform a moral act for no other reason that that
it is moral, suggests that morality has a legitimacy apart
from its consequences.
Aristotle then, in chapters five and six of Book II, attempts
to define virtue more specifically.
constituents of the soul:
character.

It is one of three essential

passions, faculties and states of

He determines that it is a state of character, not

passions, for passions come willy-nilly and do not involve
choice which is an essential condition of virtue.

Virtue is

not a faculty because faculties come into existence by nature
whereas moral virtue results from habit.73
Having determined that virtue is a state of character
Aristotle next attempts to describe what kind of state it is.

Every virtue or excellence both brings into
good condition the thing of which it is the
excellence and makes the work of that thing

73N.E. 1105b 20, 1106a 10.
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be done well....Therefore, if this is true
in every case, the virtue of man also will
be the state of character which makes a man
good and which makes him do his own work well.7i+

Virtue is the perfecting element of the human personality.

Its

existence establishes his individual integrity and renders
worth to his achievements.
At this point Aristotle completes his delineation of the
concept of moral virtue.

To recapitulate:

the first six

chapters of Book II describe the phenomena of moral virtue or
excellence.
matters.

It is first of all distinguished from intellectual

Moral virtue must take into account significant non-

rational aspects of human experience such as pleasure and pain
because they figure considerably in motivation for action.
This is an explicit repudiation of the Socratic dictum "virtue
is knowledge."

Aristotle's conception of moral virtue cannot

legitimately be interpreted as intellectualistic because of the
value and impact he attributes to the non-rational psychological
forces which constitute

the volitional dimension of the human

psyche.
Moral virtue is defined specifically as a state of
character which perfects the agent and his actions.

This state

of character assumes excellence or virtue at the conclusion
of a long process of consistent habit forming directives so
that whenever the agent acts he does solely because the act is

7t*N.E. 1106a 15-20.
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good in itself.

The morally excellent person that Aristotle

envisages is one who has practiced virtuous acts for so long
sind so consistently that it would be extremely painful for
him to do otherwise.
The paradigm of the virtuous act lies in a mean.

This

"mean" is what Aristotle conceives as the ennobling, preserving
measure of all human acts.

The mean avoids excess and defect

which result in vicious and unwholesome consequences.
Such then is Aristotle's analysis of moral virtue.

He

devotes the conclusion of Book II and the next three Books to
the consideration of specific vices and virtues such as courage
and temperance.

His purpose is to determine the relation of

the specific virtue, the mean, to the excesses and defects,
vices, into which it may degenerate.

There is however, a point

that arises upon the introduction of the concept of the mean
in Book II.
of the mean.

The point concerns the epistemological determination
In his summary definition of moral virtue in

Book II he says:

Virtue, is a mean, i.e., the mean relative
to us, this being determined by a rational
principle, and by that principle by which
the mati of practical wisdom would determine
it.75

Here is the instrumental concept of practical wisdom.
determines what constitutes the mean.

It

The concept of practical

75N.E. 1107a 1-5.
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wisdom is developed in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics after
Aristotle concludes his examination of specific virtues.
In examining the epistemological problem of practical
wisdom I wish to emphasize three ways by which Aristotle treats
the concept.

He first of all examines the relation between

practical wisdom and moral virtue or, in different words, the
relation between intellect and character.

He also examines

practical wisdom in its relation to other intellectual virtues.
And, thirdly, he looks at practical wisdom in the concrete,
that is, he asks to what men do we attribute this virtue, who
in fact, is the practically wise man?
Book VI opens by raising the problem of how the mean is
determined.

There is a standard which determines the mean
states which we say are intermediate between
excess and defect, being in accordance with
the right rule. But such a statement, though
true is by no means clear; for not only here
but in all other pursuits which are objects
of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we
must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts
too much nor too little, but to an inter
mediate extent and as the right rule dictates;
but if a man had only this knowledge he would
be none the wiser - e.g., we should not know
what sort of medicines to apply to our body
if someone were to say ’all those which the
medical art prescribes, and which agree with
practice of one who posses the art! Hence it
is necessary with regard to the states of the
soul also that it should be determined what
is the right rule and what is the standard
that fixes it.76

76N.E. 1139b 25-35.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The point that Aristotle makes here is that to state that
in matters of conduct we should aim at an intermediate state
and do as the practically wise man does, is to make a judgement
that is obviously true but substantially inadequate.

He asks

for a substantive account of principles that determine the mean.
The mean, as he states, is determined by an appeal to the
"right rule."

How Aristotle determines this right rule is a

crucial factor in interpretation as it constitutes the norm to
which all moral judgements must appeal.
Aristotle attempts to show how the intellect functions
with respect to character formation or how intelligence bears
upon moral conduct in determining principles by which the
agent is supposed to act.
Aristotle first distinguishes two kinds of reasoning
capacities according to the kinds of objects with which they
deal.

There is a reasoning about necessary, invariable objects

and relations which he terms scientific.

There is a second

kind of reasoning which deals with contingent affairs which
he terms the calculative or the deliberative.

He affirms that

this calculative or deliberative reasoning faculty does grasp
rational principles.

"Therefore the calculative is one part

of the faculty which grasps a rational principle."77
Now, how does the reasoning capacity enter into relation
with moral virtue?

He first defines moral virtue with respect

77N.E. 1139a 12.
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to choice.

Moral virtue is a state of character con
cerned with choice and choice is deliberate
desire; therefore both the reasoning must
be true and the desire right, if the choice
is to be good, and the latter must pursue
what the former asserts.78

Intellectual Virtue {Pure Thought or Intellect}-Pertains to-Truth &
Falsity

Desire-Pertains to-Pursuit & Avoidance
- Choice

Moral Virtue Deliberate Reason
Practical Wisdom

-Pertains to-Truth &
Falsity

Choice = Correct Reasoning + Proper Desire
= Moral Virtue Embodied in a Particular State of Character

The key concept in this scheme is choice.

Choice combines

the strength and propriety of desire with the correctness of
deliberative reason.

Thus to be morally virtuous one must be

able to reason properly in order to know what to choose.
requires a substantial amount of practical experience.

This
Also,

one must be inclined to make the proper choices, that is, to
desire the right things.

The purpose of moral character is to

ensure intelligent action which can arise only out of a state
of character which yearns for what is good and knows how to bring
it about.

78N.E. 1139a 20-25.
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Aristotle has now identified the role of the intellect with
respect to the moral capacity and function.

Aristotle's next

step is to determine what kind of intellectual process is
involved in practical wisdom and what its relation is to other
kinds of intellectual practices.
Of the five distinctive kinds of intellectual operations
described by Aristotle in Book VI, chapter 3 (art, scientific
knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive
reason), it is practical wisdom which characterizes the
intellectual dimension of moral conduct.

Aristotle devotes the

fifth chapter of Book VI to a discussion and definition of
practical wisdom.

It is important here that he begins by saying

that in coming to an understanding of practical wisdom, "we
shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we
credit with it."79

In order to understand the nature of practical

wisdom it must first be identified in a concrete individual.
This judgement implies that practical wisdom is a kind of an
intellectual disposition determined by considerable experience
rather than an organized objectively determined set of principles
or a defined methodological procedure which serves to increase
knowledge.

Practical wisdom cannot be scientific or theoretical

in nature because there are no first principles which are
capable of being incontrovertably demonstrated.

The principles

ar-

79N.E. 1140a 25.
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of practical wisdom are dictated by concrete experience and the
practically wise man appeals to experience when required to
make a choice, thus the more extensive and rich that experience
is the more

consistently reasonable his choice will be.

Aristotle makes additional claims for practical wisdom.
It pertains to the "good life in general."
deliverative excellence.

It involves

It cannot be scientific knowledge for

the above given reason and it cannot be art because the value
of art is derived from the achievement of the product, while
moral activity obtains an intrinsic value.

Finally he

offers an ostensible definition of practical wisdom.

"Practical

wisdom then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to
act with regard to human good."80

Practical wisdom by virtue

of its definition is the intellectual process which pertains
to moral dimensions.

Moral virtue determins a condition which

obtains good and proper desires while practical wisdom aims at
best securing these objects of desire.
The identification and analysis by Aristotle of these two
concepts, moral virtue and practical wisdom, serve to express
an understanding of moral phenomenon which can account for its
complexity.

The concept of moral virtue pertains to non-rational

elements, pleasure and pain, and the consequences these forces
have in the way of shaping character.

Because moral virtue does

80N.E. 1140b 20.
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not arise naturally and requires specifically defined human
endeavors in order for it to be brought into being, the notion
of education figures as a significant concept in terms of
causal relevance.

The recognition by Aristotle that moral

virtue or excellence is the consequence of a systematic imposi
tion of appetitive prescriptions attests to an unwillingness
to make moral phenomenon an exclusive intellectual process.
One must first be disposed to desiring what is good.

This

disposition must be integrated with a practical intellectual
excellence (practical wisdom) experiencially fostered, deriving
its principles from the evidence of fruitful consequences.
As stated above, the two books of the Nichomachean Ethics,
Books II and VI, which develop the above treated concepts of
moral virtue and practical wisdom, indicate an orientation to
ward the subject matter which undermines a strict teleological
character and introduce factors which betray on Aristotle's
part a certain irresolution and ambiguity with respect to the
precise role morals play within human experience.
Let us exploit this seeming ambiguity by scrutinizing the
concept of moral virtue in terms of commonly conceived
categories of justification, that is, justification by consequence
and justification by intrinsic value.

Does Aristotle justify

moral actions solely by appeal to their consequences?

What, in

fact, does Aristotle consider to be a relevant consequence?
One of the consequences discussed in Books I and X, is the
"Good."

The good is an end desired for its own sake, it is the
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ultimate purpose for action.

All actions are undertaken with

the hope, purpose and expectation that ultimately the good
(happiness) will follow as a consequence.

Thus, the criteria

for determining whether an act is worthwhile is the existence
of a reasonable expectation that it will make us happy.
There is another kind of consequence that is considered
by Aristotle as relevant.
make us happy?

First, we ask, what kind of actions

Actions that tend to produce happiness are

ones that proceed from a particular kind of character, a moral
character.

Hence, one reason for acting in a moral manner is

to produce a moral state or disposition.

In other words, one

hopes that a moral character will develop as a consequence of
repeated moral acts.

But what status of entelechy does this

moral character have in the conceptual totality of Aristotle's
ethical theory?

Moral perfection, it seems, is in some way an

accomplishment in and of itself desireable and laudable.
Consider specifically Aristotle's remarks about the virtue of
courage.

As we have said, then, courage is a mean with
respect to things that inspire confidence or
fear, in the circumstances that have been
stated; and it chooses or endures things be
cause it is noble to do so, or because it is
base not to do so.81

81N.E. 1116a 10-12.
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A person with a courageous character performs brave actions
because the activity is by itself worthwhile.

So is it, it seems, that in order to be good
one must be in a certain state when one does
the several acts, that is, one must do them
as a result of choice and for the sake of
the acts themselves.82

So the justifying consequences of actions in these considerations
are different from those given in Book I; one performs virtuous
actions solely because they are virtuous.

This treatment by

Aristotle of moral virtue establishes a deontological character
within his ethics.

This emphasis creates a problem with respect

to Aristotle's teleological emphasis on the good, happiness,
as being the justification for all that we do.

The good, is a

non-moral, theoretical goal.

Happiness consists in

philosophical contemplation.

It has no need for moral virtue.

But that perfect happiness is a contemplative
activity will appear from the following
consideration as well. We assume the gods to
be above all other beings blessed and happy;
but what sort of actions must we assign to
them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods
seem absurd if they
contracts and return
deposits and so on? Acts of a brave man,
then, confronting dangers and running risks
because it is noble to do so? Or liberal
acts? To whom will they give?...If we were
to run through them all, the circumstances
of actions would be found trivial and
unworthy of gods.83

82N.E. 1144a 17-20.
83N.E. 1178b 10-20.
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Moral virtue is a practical goal.
to act properly.

Its aim is to educate one

But the contemplative ideal excludes action

as being an inferior activity.

However, Aristotle, as indicated

above, suggests that a moral character is a worthwhile end in
itself, not completely a propaedeutic to the philosophical
life.

How then are these two seemingly contradictory elements

to be understood?

Is there, in fact, a contradiction?

Is

there a confusion or lack of resolution which brings about
unresolvable theoretical aims?
I believe it would be fruitful to address this problem,
at least partially by examining the historical consequences.
Aristotle introduced two fundamental ethical concepts:
consequence, and obligation.

Yet, the full implications of

both these concepts were not completely recognized.
Kantian moral philosophy and English utilitarianism
represent the logical extremes to which each of these concepts
were developed and incorporated as suppositions within the
respective systems.

Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill, two of the

prominent representatives of utilitarianism, propose an ethical
system in which the consequence of an action is the sole
criteria for an estimate of its moral value.

For Bentham, as

for Aristotle, the purpose of human activities is to promote
a state of happiness.

The differences lies in the fact that

Bentham holds pleasure and the absence of pain to be equatable
with happiness, a view that would be unacceptable to Aristotle,
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and utility as the principle which determines how pleasure is
to be most effectively collectively promoted.84

Moreover,

Bentham claims that pleasure and pain are the only criterion
for moral value.

Good will, good intentions cannot be con

sidered when evaluating an act.

It is frequent to hear men speak of a good
intention, of a bad intention: of the
goodness and badness of a man's intention:
a circumstances on which great stress is
generally laid....Strictly speaking,
nothing can be said to be good or bad,
but either in itself; which is the case
only with pain or pleasure: or on account
of its effects; which is the case only
with things that are the causes or
preventives of plain and pleasure.85

For Bentham pleasure and pain are sole criterion because only
they can be subjected to objective measurement.

His relegation

of morality to psychology is the consequence of his radical
empiricism, a methodology which aims to subject moral phenomenon
to scientific calculation.
J. S. Mill advances, as does Bentham, the principle of
utility as the only valid conceptual foundation for ethics.

The creed which accepts as the foundation
of morals utility, or the greatest happiness

84Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1:
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ed.
John Bowring (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962). p. 1
85loc. cit., p. 42.
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principle, holds that actions are right
in proportion as they tend to promote
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce
the reverse of happiness. By "happiness"
is intended pleasure and the absence of
pain.85

His departure from Bentham consists in his claim for a
qualitative difference among available human pleasures.

In

this respect he is closer to Aristotle in that he believes
that intellectual pleasures have a superiority to physical
pleasures.87

He is, however, fully committed to the principle

that actions are good or bad, irrespective of volitional or
motivational considerations, by virtue of their consequences.

Utilitarian moralists have gone beyond
almost all others in affirming that the
motive has nothing to do with the morality
of the action, though much with the worth
of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature
from drowning does what is morally right,
whether his motive be duty, or the hope of
getting paid for his trouble.88

Utilitarianism constitutes a pure form of teleological
ethics.

It is distinct from Aristotle's teleology, and, if so,

where does this distinction come about?

Both Aristotle and

85John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism", in The Philosophy
of J. S. Mill, Ed. Marshall Cohen (New York: Modern Library,
1961), p. 33.
87loc. cit., pp. 330-340.
88loc. cit., p. 343.
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and Mill would be in disagreement over the nature of happiness;
for Aristotle happiness consists in philosophic contemplation,
for Mill, pleasure, albeit the pleasure is of an intellectual
nature, it is nevertheless pleasure which is the ultimate
conisderation.

Both philosophers would be in agreement that

conduciveness to happiness is the primary consideration in
evaluating human actions.

The significant distinction between

the two lies in Mill's emphasis on the material act over
internal considerations of will and motivation.

One of the

reasons for the emphasis is that, for Mill, happiness consists
of pleasurable experiences.
consequence of an act.

Pleasure can be the immediate

Thus the action and its immediate

consequences command primary status and value.

Pleasure and

pain are central considerations for Aristotle, but not as
ends, rather as means for the shaping of character.

He does

not speak of a moral or virtuous action apart from a moral
or virtuous character out of which that act proceeds.

"Actions,

then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the
just or the temperate man would do."89

Aristotle insists upon

the integration of act and character whereas Mill consistently
requires their separation.

This analysis, I believe, demonstrates

that Mill's position constitutes a teleology that is stricter
and more consistent than Aristotle's.

In strict teleological

89N.E. 1105b 5.
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terms an action can be determined good or bad only in as much
as it promotes or hinders achievement of the defined goal.

In

Mill's terms, the more an activity conduces to bring about a
pleasurable state, the more worthwhile it is.

It might be

argued that Aristotle's insistence on perfection of moral
character is to be interpreted as meaning that morality is to
be considered solely as a means to achieve his end, happiness.
However, it has already been suggested that morality is justified
intrinsically, as an achievement independent of happiness.

This

insistence by Aristotle on the absolute value of character
reveals an unwillingness to draw the strict separation between
concepts of consequence and duty.
separation for a number of reasons.
logy.

Mill insists upon the
One reason is his methodo

Mill, as Bentham, is fully committed to empiricism.

If

happiness can be made more objectively determinable, then
ethical principles and rules themselves would be less arbitrary
and dogmatic and their consequences more socially ameliorating
and equitable.

Determining the existence or value of dispositions,

intentions and motives is much more difficult than determining
the extension and quality of pleasure and pain.

Thus in terms

of this method, the principle of utility, the tendency of the
act to promote happiness, assumes the full import within the
system.
A second reason for Mill's strict teleological distinction
arises from his conception of political philosophy.

As a
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nineteenth-century advocate of parlimentary democracy, his
political philosophy is conceived in terms of defining
relationship of state's political institutions and authority
to the order of civil society.

His paradigm of government

is one which would maintain a peaceful and equitable social
order, yet promote, to the greatest extent possible, the
individual freedom of its citizens.

Mill holds that personal

freedom is the ultimate political aim and that government
power and authority should exist solely to bring about that
end.

The object of this essay [On Liberty] is to
assert one very simple principle....That
principle is, that the sole end for which
mankind are warrented, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number,
is self protection.90

This is a profound contrast to Aristotle's paternalistic
concept of the state.

If we are right in our view, and happiness
is assumed to be virtuous activity, the
active life will be the best, both for every
city collectively, and for individuals....
Hence it is evident that the same life is
best for each individual, and for states
and mankind collectively.91

Aristotle sees no qualitative difference between the state and

90J. S. Mill, "On Liberty" in The Philosophy of J. S. Mill,
op. cit., pp. 196-7.
91Politics, 1325b 15-30.
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the individual.

He does not, as do modern political theorists,

distinguish between a formal state and a civil society.
Consequently morality is as every bit a social ideal as it is
an individual one.

The function then of the statesman is a

much more ambitious and positive one than the m o d e m conception
of Mill.

The statesman's function is to make virtuous citizens

of his subjects.

The state, because of its purpose to secure

a collective good, is superior in value and status to the
individual.

For mankind always act in order to obtain
that which they think good. But if all
communities aim at some good, the state or
political community, which is the highest
of all, and which embraces all the rest,
aims at a good in a greater degree than
any other, and at the highest good.92

In light of these two differing conceptions of meaning and
extention of the state, the reasons why Mill's and Aristotle's
construction of the moral justification differ becomes more
intelligible.

Because individual autonomy is paramount and

the state exists to serve that end, the external action and
its conduciveness to promote that end take on importance to
the exclusion of other considerations for Mill.
the business of the individual.

He can only be evaluated and

held responsible for what he does.
be subjected to public scrutiny.

Character is

Only what he does can
If his action brings about no

92Politics, 1252a 1-5.
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impediment to others it is tyrannical to sanction him.
The state, for Aristotle, is a much more integral and
positive institution.

The well being, the perfection of the

individual is contingent upon his participation in a social
arrangement which cultivates his human capacities.

"He who

by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is
either a bad man or above humanity."93

Thus an individual's

entire moral being is caught up in the social order.

Because

character is essential for living well and it is the state's
purpose to make its citizens virtuous, character and the
intrinsic value of moral action are treated as an essential
part of morality.
Pure deontological ethics is best exemplied in the writings
of Immanuel Kant.

Kant's ethical system is in conception,

directly antithetical to J. S. Mill's system.

For Kant an

act can be morally esteemed only if it is done from an absolute
purity of the will.

He says at the beginning of the first

section of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals:
"Nothing in the world— indeed nothing even beyond the world can
possibly be conceived which could be called good without
qualification except a good will."9lf The concept of the good
will is embodied in the formal principle of morality which Kant
believes to be the valid universal principle which must be applied

9Politics 1253a 1.
9I*Kant, "Foundations", op. cit., p. 71.
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to any situation that demands moral action.

This principle

which is strictly formal, that is, free of any empirical and
thus contingent considerations, makes its expression as an
unconditional moral imperative, in Kant’s terminology, a
categorical imperative.
The condition for the application of the categorical
imperative arises because man finds himself as a being subject
to the physical causality of the sensible world.

He has

appetites, inclinations, physical and psychological drives which
to an extent determine his conduct and give shape to his ideals.
However, he is also a rational creature.

Rationality enables

him to transcend his contingent and relative position in the
sensible world, the world of appearances, or phenomena as
Kant terms it, and to conceive universal laws of conduct and
act upon them.

Man can act as a noumenal being.

By this freedom the will of a rational
being, as belonging to the sensuous world,
recognizes itself to be, like all other
efficient causes, necessarily subject to
the laws of causality, while in practical
matters, in other aspects as a being in
itself it is conscious of its existence
in an intelligible order of things.95

Moral obligation, the call for the categorical imperative
arises out of a tension between two modes of existences.

For

Kant, two major considerations are involved in any moral act.
First, there is the end for which an act is done, the material

95Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason", op.cit, p. 152.
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consequences which are expected from it.

The principles for

action, in this case, are based on subjective desires or
inclinations which lead one to act so as to obtain the object
desired.

A man tells the truth in order to establish a

reputation which promotes his personal, business, or political
interests.
to Kant?

Is this man acting in a moral capacity according
While such a man would be acting prudently he would

not be considered to be acting morally because the principle of
action in this case is self interest.

And while the motive and

the telling of truth coincide, the motive can never be by itself
affirmed as a universal principle as many instances may arise
when truth telling runs counter to ones personal interests.
The second consideration is that of the act apart from its
consequences, the act as being internally self justifying.
When one tells the truth simply because one believes honesty
to be a good in itself, then the act is unconditionally morally
pure.

The cause of the act is an objective one determined by

the conception and application of practical reason rather than
by a subjective causality.

Obligation arises out of a possible

conflict between what is dictated by desires and ambitions and
what is prescribed by practical reason which ignores the
consequences of the act and orders the act because of its
intrinsic

worth.

The act must be done solely for the reason

of obligation.
This principle of obligation imposes an imperative character
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which is categorical.

"Act as if the maxim of thy action were

to become by the will a universal law of nature."96

The moral

principle must be unconditionally and universally applicable.
If, for Kant, moral dilemas are resolved by this rule it is
impossible to err because to will any vicious or benighted
act, even though one gains from it, would result in a contradic
tion of will if one attempts to universalize that will.

If

one universally wills to lie in order to avoid an unpleasant
consequence one, in effect, negates the institution of truth
telling for if this practice were universally accepted the
institution would itself crumble.97
Kant is the paradigm deontologist.

Aristotle's similarity

with Kant lies in their mutual recognition of the moral value
of the motive for action and that a person must not only do the
right thing but must do it because it is the 'the right thing'
to do.

However Aristotle departs from Kantian deontology in

that he doesn't make as radical a distinction between the
concept of well being and the concept of moral obligation as
Kant.

Aristotle's conception of man, in this respect, is more

unified than Kant's.

There is no noumenal-phenomenal dualism

which has man participating in two orders, one determined and
one free.

Han participates fully in the natural order and sees

96Kant, "Foundations", op. cit. p. 38.
97loc. cit., p. 40.
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his needs and desires as being fully compatible with the
fulfillment of obligations undertaken as a part of his social
nature.

Thus, there is not the necessity on Aristotle's part

to make personal well being a wholly separate concern from
moral obligation.
Kant's system is a culmination of ethics founded upon
obligation and an explicit repudiation of teleology.

It is not

intended here to critically evaluate the positions of Kant and
the Utilitarians.
in both systems.

There are considerable flaws and weaknesses
The purpose of introducing these systems is

to show how far the concepts of teleology and deontology can
be separately and consistently developed so as to gain greater
insight into Aristotle's treatment and resolution of these
concepts, and to determine to what extent, if any, it makes sense
to call Aristotle a deontologist.
In the preceeding paragraphs we have seen employed by
Aristotle, two different approaches to moral virtue which do
not appear to be reconcilable.

He approaches moral virtue on

the one hand solely as a means to achieve happiness, which is
a wholly contemplative non-moral state.

Yet elsewhere in the

same treatise he speaks of moral virtue as something to be
cultivated for its own sake.
These two approaches create an ambiguity which is to some
extent unresolvable.

Professor William Frankena, in his book

Three Historical Philosophies of Education, directs his attention
to this problem.
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Most interpreters take him [Aristotle] to be a
teleologist (either egoistic or nationalistic)
almost without discussion, as both Joachim and
Ross do. I am inclined to agree with them on
the whole, but I think there are considerations
that point to a deontological interpretation of
Aristotle and that there is no decisive way of
determining just what his position is.98

Frankena distills from the text the two basic alternative
interpretations.

The first is:

Aristotle holds the good to

be happiness and happiness to be contemplation.
excellent activity serves that good.
interpretation.

Morally

This is the teleological

The second, the deontological, is:

the good

is happiness, happiness consists in contemplation and in moral
excellence, and furthermore moral excellence is determined by
principles derived from perception or intuition or divine
command.99
Frankena leans toward the teleological interpretation
because of Aristotle's pervasive means-end idiom and because of
what he believes is a fixed Aristotelean view that all things
aspire to God and God's life is a wholly contemplative one,
a view which he believes is well illustrated in the final
passage of the Ethica Eudemia.10 0

"William Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of
Education, (Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1965), p. 30.
"loc. cit., p. 35
100loc. cit, p. 35-36.
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God...is the end with a view to which prudence
issues its commands....That choice then...which
will most promote the contemplation of God is
most excellent; this is the noblest standard.
But any that through deficiency or excess
hinders one from the contemplation and service
of God is bad.101

But, as Frankena himself admits, this passage was quite
possibly, as Werner Jaeger claims,102 written in Aristotle's
earlier days and hence in a more Platonic posture.103

Moreover,

if we consider the manner in which moral principles are deter
mined and examine the conclusions of the tenth book of the
Nicomachean Ethics, there seems to be plausible evidence for a
deontological interpretation.
In an article entitled "Aristotle's Ethical Intuitionism"
in The New Scholasticism, Bernard Baumrin maintains that
Aristotle is decisively a deontologist.

At no significant point in his analysis of moral
virtue does Aristotle appeal to consequences as
relevant, much less decisive, in choosing the
mean relative to us....Indeed...Aristotle's de
finition of practical wisdom depends on the
position that good is itself the aim of action
(1140b 7) and for a man to be good he must do
what he does "as a result of choice and for the
sake of the acts themselves." (1144a 19).101*

101Ethica Eudemia, 1249b 15-20.

W. D. Ross, translator.

102Werner Jaeger, Aristotle, translated by Richard Robinson
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1948), pp. 246-258.
10 3Frankena, op. cit., p . 36.
10^Baumrin, op. cit., p . 11-12.
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Central to Banmrin's interpretation is Aristotle's treatment
of the right rule.

As mentioned above (page 53) right rule is

the standard which determines the mean.
rule determined?

But how is the right

If one ascribes to a strict teleology the

source of the principles to be applied is obvious.
principles are derived from the predetermined goal.

The
The

principles, the right rule, can be determined by deciding what
course of action maximizes the possibility of achievement of
that good.

Deontological principles are a different case.

What is the source?

There must be some criterion other than

the possibility for achieving the sought after good.

In

teleology, the maximization of non-moral goods (in Aristotle's
case, philosophic contemplation) is the essence of the theory,
the question is, how, what principles do we use to maximize?105
For Kant, the principles are derived a priori from reason itself.
The validity of the principles are tested by their capacity to
sustain universality without self-negation.

What about Aristotle?

If he is interpreted in the deontological sense how do we
understand him to establish the source of ethical principles?
In Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle speaks of
the difficulty involved in determining the mean.

How far, therefore, and how a man must
stray before he becomes blameworthy, it
is not easy to state in words for the decision
depends on the particular facts and on perception.105

105Robin Attfield, "Toward a Defence of Teleology",
Ethics, 85, (January 1975), 123-135.
106N.E. 1226b 1-5.
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According to Baumrin, Aristotle holds that ethical principles
are derived ultimately from perception, a perception which is
essentially of an intuitive nature, "not the perception of
qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that
by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a
triangle.107

In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle

further describes this perceptive intuitive process.

All thinks which have to be done are included
among particulars or ultimates; for not only
must the man of practical wisdom know particular
facts, but understanding and judgement are also
concerned with things to be done, and these are
ultimates. And intuitive reason is concerned
with the ultimates in both directions; for both
the first terms and the last are objects of
intuitive reason and not of argument, and the
intuitive reason which is presupposed by
demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and
first terms, while the intuitive reason involved
in practical reasonings grasps the last and
variable fact, i.e., the minor premiss. For
these variable facts are the starting points
for the apprehension of the end, since the
universals are reached from the particulars;
of these therefore we must have perception,
and this perception is intuitive reason.108
Such texts as these suggest an Aristotelean view which does not
appeal to non-moral goods or values as the principles from which
ethical norms are derived.

The point is that intuitive percepts

are considered the source of ethical principles.
seems to be espousing a form of intuitionism.

Aristotle

His claim, that

intuitive reason grasps the ultimates, makes knowledge
of moral rules, judgements derived intuitively from

107N.E. 1142a 28-29.
108N.E. 1143a 32-66.
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experiences, justified epistemologically as simple, first term
perceptions.

If this in fact is the case, then Frankena’s

second proposed interpretation appears more accurate than the
first.

Morally excellent action is seen to be
right by 'perception' or which conforms to
certain rules whose validity rests not on
a consideration of consequences, but on
intuition, tradition, or divine command.109

At the beginning of this chapter I stated that Aristotle
specifies man in two different ways.
and man is a political animal.
are essential human ideals.

Man is a rational animal

Both rationality and society

Yet, these two ideals constitute

a duality out of which two kinds of perfect men emerge for
Aristotle:

the philosopher and the statesman.

This duality

is most apparent and pronounced in the tenth book of the
Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle draws the strings of the
work together and makes his conclusions.

In Book X he speaks

of both the philosopher and the statesman, and more importantly,
determines their relative value.

Discussing first the

philosopher, he says that philosophical activity is the ultimate
value.

If happiness is actively in accordance
with virtue, it is reasonable that it
should be in accordance with the highest
virtue....That this activity is
contemplation we have already said.110

109prankena, op. cit., p. 35.
110N.E. 1177a 15-20.
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But he goes on to say that contemplation is dependent upon
leisure and that leisure is attained and sustained by political
activity which is by nature unleisurely and hence subordinate
to the higher contemplative activity.

So if among virtuous actions political and
military actions are distinguished by
nobility and greatness, and these are
unleisurely and aim at an end and are not
desirable for their own sake, but the
activity of reason, which is contemplative
seems both to be superior in serious worth
and to aim at no end beyond itself.111

However, Aristotle qualifies this contemplative ideal.

But such a life [a contemplative one]
would be too high for man; for it is not
in so far as he is man that he will live
so, but in so far as something divine
is present in him.112

It is through the cultivation of reason by which man transcends
his mortal human nature.

But as a human being there is a

lesser more attainable form of happiness which is realized
through morality and social institutions.

"But in a secondary

degree the life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is
happy; for the activities in accordance with this befit our
human estate."113

This is the perfection that man achieves as

111N.E- 1177b 15-20.

112n .e . 1177b 25.
113n .e . 1178a 10.
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a social-political creature, lesser in value but more attainable
and more human.

The statesman is the paradigm of this ideal in

as much he represents the embodiment of social virtues.

The

statesman enacts laws which produce a society of good people.

But it is difficult to get from youth up
a right training for virtue if one has
not been brought up under right laws....
For this reason their [young peoples]
nurture and training should be fixed
by law.11^

Most men do not develop philosophical rationality.

The

kind of rationality they do achieve is a preservative replace
ment for natural instinct in the form of a social arrangement
which replaces instinct with education.

This is a totality,

complete, apart from philosophical speculation.
is a practical moral perfection.

This is true of most men.

Man is by nature a political creature.

The development of this

nature is through political institutions.
the institutions.

How?

Its perfection

Morality perfects

It establishes within men a certain

kind of character, a kind of disposition to act preservingly
in the case of courage and temperance, and to act justly in
the case of material goods.
Aristotle, by holding that man's ultimate value is
philosophical contemplation, must invoke a teleological con
ception of human action which subordinates all other activities,
including morality to a lesser status.

However this contemplative

nitN.E. 1179b 30-35.
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ideal is for Aristotle an ultra-human ideal.
ideals are realized in a well ordered society.
is a moral ideal.

Typically human
The state itself

Its purpose is to make men good.

In the

Politics, Aristotle says that "political society exists for the
sake of noble actions."115

It is in this aspect that goodness

and morality are equatable and morality takes on the character
of an established end in itself.
Thus it would seem that Frankena's evaluation "that there
is no decisive way of determining just what his [Aristotle's]
position is," is too cautious.

It would perhaps be more accurate

to say that he is both teleologist and deontologist.

W. D. Ross,

who, as Frankena mentions, interprets Aristotle as an ethical
teleologist, alludes to the problem I have raised in the final
page of this chapter on Aristotle's Ethics.

The part assigned to the moral life then by
Aristotle seems to be twofold. (1) It con
stitutes a secondary form of well being, one
which we are driven to fall back upon by the
fact that we are not all reason and cannot
live always on the level of the contemplative
life. And (2) it helps to bring into being
the higher kind. Aristotle says very little
about how it does this....But though his formal
theory thus makes the moral life subsidiary to
the intellectual, this relation is not worked
out in detail. When Aristotle is engaged in
studying the moral activities he treats them
as good in themselves, and the moral agent as
finding his motive in nothing beyond the act,
but in its own nobility. In effect he assigns
a higher value to the moral life than his
formal theory warrants.116

115Politics 1281a 1.
116W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London:
233-4.

Methuen & Co., 1923), p.
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The second to the last sentence in this quotation, "when
Aristotle is engaged in studying the moral activities he treats
them as good in themselves, and the moral agent as finding his
motive nothing beyond.11, amounts to an admission of Aristotle's
failure or, perhaps better said, unwillingness to be thoroughly
teleological.
When Aristotle is speaking generally about human nature
and social institutions he speaks as a teleologist, as in the
first book of the Nicomachean Ethics where he states that all
human activities aim at some good.

His basic view of the world

is teleological and man as a part of the natural order simply
must have an end or purpose.

But when he deals with the

subjects of morality and political activity he speaks as a
deontologist.

Moral virtue becomes an end in itself.

He sees

society as the place where man perfects his moral nature, a
place where morally virtuous qualities are highly exalted as
achievements in their own right.
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CONCLUSION

In this study I have attempted to apply two basic ethical
conceptual categories to Aristotle's ethical system.

Attempts

to label Aristotle as a teleologist or deontologist can have
value only to the extent to which they contribute to an
understanding of his thought and to an analysis of the concepts
themselves and how these concepts must apply to an understanding
of ethical problems.
In assessing Aristotle's thought I have attempted to show
that his ethical formulations proceed from a general view in
which man is perceived as a member of the natural order and
that that order itself is vested with purpose.

Thus the

question, what is best for man, calls for an answer which defines
his purpose and the means to attain it.

Aristotle defines man

as both a rational and a social animal, and sees his perfection
lying in the cultivation of his reasoning powers and in the
development of his social being.

It is morality which perfects

him as a social being and moral education is absolutely
primary if he is to realize his human potential, for it is
morality which brings into existence a well ordered society
from which proceeds pursuits both theoretical and practical.
Thus while the context of Aristotle's thought is constructed
in a teleological framework there is at the same time a concern
for the intrinsic value of moral conduct.

81

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82

The concept of ends and the concept of intrinsic moral
value are fundamental to any coherent ethical system.

While

Aristotle is devoted principally to man's end, he recognized
the importance of intrinsic moral value and constructed an
ethical system which would be criticized for its failure to
develop a complete theory of obligation and praised for its
analysis of human nature.
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